

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.240
15 February 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 15 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

(Bulgaria)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECEBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. W. WACHTMEISTER
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I. M. PALENYKH
Mr. G. K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir H. BEELEY
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE
Mr. D. S. MACDONALD
Mr. G. BUNN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. P. P. SPINELLI

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I declare open the two hundred and fortieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list today one speaker - the representative of India. But, before calling on him, I should like to inform the Committee of the following proposal of our two co-Chairmen:

"The co-Chairmen wish to propose to the Committee that the present meeting, the two hundred and fortieth, should be devoted to a continuation of the general debate, and that at the next meeting, the two hundred and forty-first, those representatives wishing to speak in the general debate should have first preference, after which the remainder of the meeting should be devoted to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some succeeding meetings should also be devoted to the question of non-proliferation.

"This proposal is not intended to preclude the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any subject or proposal in any plenary meeting of the Committee."

The proposal of the two co-Chairmen is dated 15 February 1966. Does anyone wish to comment on it? If there are no objections, we may consider the proposal adopted.

It was so decided.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I should like to take the opportunity of my first intervention in the general debate in the Committee to thank the representatives who have spoken before me: those of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Nigeria, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Poland, Bulgaria -- that is, yourself, Mr. Chairman -- Brazil and Romania, who have been kind enough to offer their condolences to us on the losses we have suffered in the untimely death of our late Prime Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, and of the late Chairman of our Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Homi Bhabha. Their sentiments express the continued affection and good will of these representatives and their Governments towards the Government and the people of our country, and we are deeply grateful to them for their words of grief, solace and appreciation.

It is a matter of deep gratification to the Indian delegation that we have lost no time in resuming the work of this Committee soon after the adjournment of the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. It gives us particular

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

pleasure to be able to continue our collaboration with our old colleagues and to offer our warm welcome to those who have joined us this session either for the first time or after a period of absence. The Indian delegation extends its good wishes to Ambassador Anha Aberra of Ethiopia, Mr. Ijewere of Nigeria, Mr. Blusztajn of Poland, Count Wachtmeister of Sweden and Ambassador Khallaf of the United Arab Republic, and assures them of its co-operation in the vital task which the international community has entrusted to this Committee: namely, negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures, arms control and limitation, and reduction of tension.

We shall miss our good friends, Ambassador Hassan, Ambassador Imru and, very shortly, Mr. Obi; but we trust that they will continue to help us in their new assignments. The Indian delegation further extends its welcome to Mr. Spinelli, who has joined us this session and has brought us the hopes and good wishes of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Indian delegation would also take this opportunity to congratulate the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the epoch-making Soviet achievement in effecting a soft landing on the moon.

The Committee is particularly fortunate this session in receiving the inspiring message from His Holiness the Pope on the resumption of our work. It is imperative that we bear in mind in our negotiations the basic consideration stressed by the Holy Father: namely, that "no lasting peace can be established among men until there has been an effective, general and controlled reduction in armaments." (ENDC/163, p.3)

At our very first meeting, on 27 January, the representative of the United Arab Republic made a pertinent observation on the task facing the committee now. He said:

"We are meeting this year at Geneva at a time when a certain number of different developments and factors have combined to strengthen the general cause of disarmament and to give it a new impulse. It would not be without interest to try to discuss here together our ideas on the cause of disarmament as it stands now that we are resuming our work at Geneva."

(ENDC/PV.235, p.34)

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

As Mr. Khallaf pointed out, the period between our last session and the present session was highly productive, and the debates in the twentieth session of the General Assembly and the resolutions adopted by it have certain positive and realistic elements from the viewpoint of procedure as well as of substance.

The preceding speakers have emphasized that the General Assembly adopted by overwhelming majorities five principal resolutions on issues of disarmament. These resolutions thus reflect the views not of this or that country, this or that group, this or that region, but of the entire international community. It is therefore essential that we should direct our attention exhaustively and comprehensively to the terms of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

In addition to the resolutions dealing with the questions of a world disarmament conference and the denuclearization of Africa, with which the Committee is not presently concerned, there were three resolutions, 2028(XX), 2031(XX) and 2032(XX) (ENDC/161), dealing respectively with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament, and the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

The resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is indeed an historic document and, as pointed out by the representative of Nigeria at our meeting of 27 January (ENDC/PV.235, p.30), it is comparable in its importance to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). The McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement forms the basic framework for our negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and specifies the essential requirements of an acceptable treaty. So does resolution 2028(XX), with its operative paragraph laying down five essential principles which should form the basis of any acceptable treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is these three resolutions which provide, as it were, the agenda and the terms of reference of the current session of the Committee.

First, there is the question of general and complete disarmament. This is our basic task, for this Committee has been established for the specific purpose of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We have not devoted much attention to this problem recently, but have concentrated only on collateral issues. The collateral problems are undoubtedly important, but there is sometimes a tendency to miss the wood for the trees. Devotion to an isolated collateral measure often creates a disequilibrium of approach which tends to treat that particular measure as an end in itself or, even worse, to suggest solutions which violate the basic philosophy of disarmament: that of reduction and eventual elimination of armaments. There are many scholars and commentators, therefore, who are consequently apt to conclude

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

that general and complete disarmament is not possible of achievement or is a myth. As a general rule, any suggestion which envisages, on the one hand, control over some people and, on the other hand, unfettered licence to others in the field of armaments, thus militates directly and fundamentally against this basic philosophy of disarmament.

It is encouraging to note that the messages which we have received from President Johnson, Premier Kosygin, Prime Minister Wilson and Secretary-General U Thant stress the urgency of going ahead with our negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In the Committee we have had many comments on the problems of security and on methods of ensuring the security of nations; but the Indian delegation is convinced that the real security of all nations can be safeguarded only in the context of disarmament. It is not the armaments of other nations, in any case, which can be a perpetual guarantor of a nation's integrity and independence. It is therefore gratifying that all these personages continue to stress the urgent and vital task of negotiating a treaty on comprehensive disarmament.

To some extent, resolution 2031(XX) on general and complete disarmament was a procedural resolution. It was heartening to note, however, that the membership of the United Nations had faith and confidence in this Committee; but that puts a corresponding obligation upon the Committee to justify that faith and confidence. Moreover, the resolution did in fact ask the Committee to continue its efforts towards making substantial progress. That is the Committee's mandate: it has to make substantial progress on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Indian delegation hopes that, once the Committee has concluded the general debate and the general discussion on principles governing an appropriate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it will pay special attention to the issues of general and complete disarmament.

This resolution also requested the Committee to continue its efforts towards reaching agreement on collateral measures. The messages from the distinguished personages which have been circulated as Conference documents place appropriate emphasis on various measures of this nature. The Indian delegation trusts that negotiations on these measures will not be completely side-tracked by the prominence we may give to more important issues, such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the suspension of tests. I do not intend to go into the details of all these measures during this intervention, but I should like to emphasize one particular proposal for consideration.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

In this imperfect world of ours there are differences among nations on many issues, but one of the fundamental principles which we need to adopt in international relations is that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, and of respect for their independence, integrity and sovereignty. Allied to this principle, or as a corollary to it, is the principle of renunciation of force for the settlement of disputes. This matter was debated exhaustively during the last session of the General Assembly, which adopted a noteworthy resolution on it. (A/RES/2131(XX)/Rev.1). In this Committee also we have had discussions on this issue in the past, and references have been made to it during the current session.

I am mentioning this matter specifically as many representatives have referred to the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan and to the "Tashkent spirit". The Indian delegation is convinced that the approach underlying that Agreement is the only approach to international relations. As the Tashkent Declaration pointed out:

"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good-neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligations under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means....

"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other."

Another resolution, 2032 (XX), urged that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended. As the members of the Committee are aware, India was the first country to focus international attention on the need to suspend all nuclear weapon tests, and nearly twelve years ago appealed to the Disarmament Sub-Committee, as it was called at that time, to put an end to them. Year after year and session after session, India brought up the issue in the United Nations General Assembly and, although it was not successful initially, that august Assembly finally adopted an historic resolution (A/RES/1762(XVII)) which condemned all nuclear weapon tests.

This is one field in which the international community has achieved noteworthy progress. The Moscow test-ban Treaty of August 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was hailed by all peace-loving peoples of the world as a significant first step in the march of humanity towards sanity and international security. There was general hope then that this first step would be followed by other steps, in the field both of nuclear

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

weapon tests and of other measures of disarmament. Unfortunately subsequent developments have belied these hopes. The Moscow Treaty continues to be partial in more ways than one. Its prohibition still does not extend to underground tests, and no progress has been achieved in that direction despite the pleas of the non-aligned delegations and the resolutions of the United Nations. The last session of the General Assembly, therefore, urged again that all nuclear weapon tests be suspended. In addition, the resolution in question asked this Committee to continue, with a sense of urgency, its work on a formal comprehensive test-ban treaty, and referred in that context to the improved possibilities of international co-operation in the field of seismic detection.

At this stage the Indian delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Swedish delegation for the constructive ideas on international seismic co-operation which it has put forward in Geneva and New York (ENDC/154). India would like to see all countries agreeing to suspend all nuclear weapon tests. We can then consider what steps the international scientific community can take in mutual co-operation so that such suspension, and later a formal treaty, can be adequately observed.

India has already offered its co-operation in this connexion. We have in our country a well-established system of seismological observation, and three months ago we established a sensitive array of seismometers at Gauribidunur, about fifty miles north of Bangalore in South India. This array consists of two seven-mile-long arms, which will be extended later to fifteen miles each, and is located in a very suitable geographical area with exposures of old granite rocks. The background of earth noise at the site is sufficiently low to ensure that small earthquakes at long distances can be recorded by the array. The data gathered at this station will be published and available to all countries.

The Moscow test-ban Treaty, however, is not only partial because it is partial in its prohibited environments and leaves out underground nuclear weapon tests; it is much more regrettably partial in that it has been adhered to only partially by the international community. The peoples of the world were concerned primarily with nuclear weapon tests which spread death-dealing radioactive debris over fields and habitations, over rivers and lakes, over men, women and children. They condemned the callousness of those who, in the pursuit of their policies and purposes,

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

contaminated crops, cattle and men alike and increased the danger not only of cancer and leukaemia, but also of genetic and hereditary hazards to children yet unborn.

And yet one country, in its arrogance and recalcitrance, in its utter disregard of the will and welfare of humanity, not only refused to subscribe to this treaty but even gloried in its refusal and in its defiance. The refusal of the People's Republic of China to subscribe to the Moscow Treaty and its flamboyant explosion of atomic devices, not once but twice, is thus a much more serious problem than the lack of progress on reaching agreement on prohibition of underground tests.

As the Indian delegation said in New York during the last session of the General Assembly, the first priority in this field is thus to be accorded to the task of making the Moscow test-ban Treaty universally binding. This is not a treaty which is subscribed to by a few Powers with vested interests and their allies; it is a treaty which the non-aligned and non-nuclear nations have urged from the beginning and have signed in an overwhelming number. It is therefore urgent and vital for the international community to examine what steps should be taken to ensure the universality of acceptance of this very partial Moscow test-ban Treaty.

It is not a fruitful exercise to contemplate the "what-would-have-been" of any situation, but it appears to me that the great emphasis that is being placed by some people on what is euphemistically called further proliferation -- as if the single and organic problem of proliferation can be vivisected -- would have been much less today were it not for this recalcitrance of one country in not subscribing to the Moscow test-ban Treaty and in embarking on a senseless programme of production of nuclear weapons.

The most significant resolution adopted by the United Nations during the twentieth session was on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161). It was, as I said earlier, an historic resolution laying down in clear terms the main principles on which an international treaty on non-proliferation should be based. Earlier, on 15 September 1965, during the last session of our Committee, the non-aligned delegations submitted a joint memorandum (ENDC/158) putting forward their basic approach to the question of non-proliferation. The memorandum emphasized that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an end

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

in itself but only a means to an end, and the inescapable requirement that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with some tangible steps and followed by other tangible steps of halting the arms race and limiting, reducing and eventually eliminating the nuclear menace. The United Nations resolution was posited on this basic approach.

Resolution 2028 (XX) gives us our terms of reference. The international community has overwhelmingly instructed us to negotiate within a specific framework and in consonance with a specific set of principles, as it believes that only a faithful and precise implementation of these principles can meet the approval of the peoples of the world and can really solve the problem of proliferation.

There appears to be a tendency, not so much among those who are familiar with the subject as among laymen, to think that the only proposals on the problem of non-proliferation are two draft treaties, one presented by the Soviet Union (ENDC/164) and the other by the United States (ENDC/152), that these are the only two documents which need to be reconciled in order to arrive at an internationally-acceptable treaty. As the representative of Italy pointed out the other day (ENDC/PV.236, p.6), the United Nations resolution specifically mentioned the two draft treaties, the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Committee (ENDC/158), and the Italian proposal for a moratorium (ENDC/157).

The United Nations resolution, in fact, places all these documents in their proper perspective. In the first place, it notes with satisfaction the efforts made by the eight non-aligned members of the Committee to achieve a solution of the problem of non-proliferation, as contained in their joint memorandum. It also notes the declarations adopted by the Organization of African Unity (A/5975) and the non-aligned Conference (A/5763), as well as the two draft treaties presented respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union and the draft moratorium declaration presented by Italy.

The Indian delegation believes that it is essential that the Committee examine in detail the framework of a treaty on non-proliferation, as prescribed by the United Nations. Unless this basic framework is kept constantly in view and adhered to faithfully, one is apt to concentrate only on some aspects of the problem and ignore the other equally important, if not more important, aspects.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

We in this Committee are a group of negotiators, and we have been given the terms of reference for our negotiations. The Committee is composed of eighteen members and was specifically enlarged from its old composition of ten, consisting of five members of the NATO group and five members of the Warsaw group, so as to include eight non-aligned members. The essence of negotiations in the Committee, therefore, is to negotiate among the entire group, representing the general complexion of the world community, and not just to reconcile the views of the two alliances.

In this context I should like to refer to the sentiments expressed by the Nigerian delegation both in New York and in Geneva. On 27 January the representative of Nigeria advised us (ENDC/PV.235, p.30), and very rightly, that the problem should not be viewed in a myopic or lopsided fashion, reflecting the anxieties and the needs of two Powers or ten Powers. All members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have to look at the problem in a global context and in accordance with the directives given to them by the international community, as reflected in the United Nations resolution.

We have been aware of three different approaches emerging in the discussions in New York and in Geneva on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the Indian delegation pointed out during the discussions at the last session of the General Assembly, these three approaches broadly were: first, the non-aligned, non-nuclear, approach; second, the interim approach as reflected in the Italian draft declaration of a moratorium; and third, the approach of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their partners in military alliances and others who feel that their security is safeguarded by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers. We appreciated that there were divergences of varying degree even among the delegations which favoured a particular approach; but basically the discussions revealed these three general trends.

I need not recount in detail at this stage the elements of these three approaches. The non-aligned, non-nuclear nations follow the guide-lines laid down at the summit conferences of their Heads of State or Government and sustain the understanding of the problem as given in the non-aligned memorandum of 15 September 1965 -- namely, that a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

in itself but a means to an end; that this end is the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, of nuclear disarmament; and that therefore measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with, or followed by, tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

There is sometimes a misunderstanding in some minds in respect of this position, and it is alleged that what the non-nuclear, non-aligned countries want is to achieve general disarmament, or at least nuclear disarmament, as part of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A comment of this nature reveals a complete misreading of the non-aligned position, as we see it. To be sure, the non-aligned nations are determined to continue to urge on all concerned the imperative need to achieve general and complete disarmament; but they do not say that general and complete disarmament must form part of a non-proliferation treaty, or that there can be no treaty on non-proliferation unless there is comprehensive or even nuclear disarmament. They do not say that the nuclear-weapon Powers must reduce their existing stockpiles of these dreadful and much-multiplied nuclear weapons before the international community can agree on a treaty on non-proliferation.

They do not say any of these things; all that they do say is that certain measures, integral and organic to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons, must be taken. As the Indian delegation sees it, they go further and say that some measures of limitation and "un-armament", if I may be permitted to coin a word, should be coupled with measures to prevent proliferation, while other measures of limitation, control and disarmament can follow. Their view is that one cannot have a spurious treaty which heaps all the control, all the limitations and all the prohibitions on non-nuclear countries, while at the same time giving a licence, even indirect encouragement, to the existing nuclear-weapon Powers themselves to proliferate and to continue with their manufacture of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. The non-aligned and non-nuclear nations do not insist on complete and comprehensive equality in this field; all they want is that at least some measures be taken which are fundamental and germane to this disease of proliferation and that the causes of proliferation be dealt with at the same time as its consequences.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

The Indian delegation has had occasion in the past to explain in detail what it considers to be the real essence of the problem of proliferation. If one wishes to diagnose a disease one must see the history of the disease. We in this Committee are obliged to go into the details and the technicalities of the problem. We must therefore ask ourselves: Why is there a problem of proliferation at all? Why is it that a third country has chosen to be a nuclear-weapon Power? Why is it that a fourth country is developing nuclear weapons and missiles? And why is it that a fifth country is embarking on a nuclear-weapon programme? Is it prestige? Is it security? Is it the menace of other nuclear-weapon Powers, incipient or otherwise? Is it the risk involved in the continuation of the existing nuclear menace, the risk of thermo-nuclear war by miscalculation, accident or design? Or is it all this together?

Surely the answers to these questions must furnish the answer to the problem of why there are debates in some countries on embarking on nuclear-weapon programmes. Above all, they must provide the real answer to the question of how the international community can help these countries -- or, as the fashionable phrase is, further countries -- to stand firm in their determination to eschew for ever any thought of production of nuclear weapons.

It appears to the Indian delegation that, first of all, we must ensure that no prestige accrues to those misguided nations which have embarked or which are embarking on nuclear-weapon programmes. There must be an end to all this talk of a high table or a top table, a select club, centres of nuclear power and a superior coterie or a group of four or five who could meet among themselves and work out the salvation of the world.

Then there is the question of security. As far as one non-aligned nations are concerned, security is not synonymous with protection, no matter how powerful the protector or how sincere. Real security lies in the elimination of the threat rather than in offering protection after the threat has been translated into actual aggression. We should like to add that what the non-nuclear, non-aligned countries urge in the context of a non-proliferation treaty is not the complete elimination of the nuclear menace here and now; all that they say is that at least a beginning should be made to halt an increase in that threat, to limit the circumference of that threat. That would not provide full security, but it would be an essential beginning.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

In this context the Indian delegation would like to welcome the recent message of 1 February from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to our Committee (ENDC/167), and in particular the willingness of the Soviet Government to include in the draft treaty on non-proliferation a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory. The Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164, p.6) stipulates that the treaty "shall enter into force after its ratification by all Parties possessing nuclear weapons," and this new clause would be a specific article in the treaty.

This is indeed a step forward in the direction of our endeavour to negotiate a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and meets one of the misgivings expressed by non-nuclear nations on the present state of affairs. The Indian delegation would like in particular to pay tribute to the Nigerian delegation, which has consistently put forward this idea as one of the essential features of any non-proliferation treaty.

To the Indian delegation the most heartening feature of this message and this willingness of the Soviet Government to amend its draft is their indication that the nuclear Powers appreciate the misgivings of the non-nuclear countries and are prepared to implement some of the ideas put forward by them in respect of a treaty on non-proliferation. We sincerely hope that the nuclear Powers will also take into account the other considerations advanced by the non-aligned non-nuclear nations, and agree to incorporate appropriate provisions in the draft treaty so as to reflect the memorandum of the non-aligned members (ENDC/158) and resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly (ENDC/161).

It is the memorandum of the non-aligned members which reflects the approach of the non-aligned non-nuclear nations -- an approach which received a wide measure of support from a vast number of delegations during the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. On the other hand there is the approach of the nuclear Powers -- the nuclear "haves" -- and their allies, and others who feel that their security is assured by the present nuclear-weapon Powers. The nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies believe that all that is necessary is to prevent others from joining the so-called nuclear club, and that the nuclear Powers themselves should continue with their own production, diversification and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. It is an approach similar to the example I quoted last August

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

in this Committee of a Mogul emperor of India who was a drunkard himself but who prohibited drinking throughout his empire (ENDC/PV.223, p.15).

The two draft treaties before us will, however, need to embody a more comprehensive approach, and a global approach. A non-proliferation treaty will need to deal with the disease, at least partially, instead of dealing merely with the symptoms. It will need to deal with the cause rather than the consequence. As the Indian delegation has always maintained, the cause is the existing proliferation. The possibility of further proliferation is only the consequence.

This is also what resolution 2028 (XX) tells us. It is necessary for the Committee, therefore, to examine carefully the five principles stipulated by the United Nations as the basis of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There is the first principle: namely, that --

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form". (A/RES/2028 (XX), ENDC/161)

The Indian delegation agrees with the Soviet delegation and others which have placed special emphasis on this principle. As we said in the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the treaty must prohibit all aspects of proliferation, direct or indirect, through military alliances or otherwise and in any form or shape. As a non-aligned nation we are unable to understand why members of military alliances should receive a special dispensation in the context of non-proliferation. There cannot be three categories of nations: nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations in alliance with nuclear nations, and non-nuclear non-aligned nations. Our eventual objective is to abolish all existing differences of this nature. That will, of course, take a long time; but we should not create a third category now and retard our progress towards the ultimate objective.

There is another element in this principle, which does not seem to have been commented upon so far. The principle, as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, forbids not only non-nuclear Powers but also nuclear Powers to proliferate. It says so specifically and categorically. It does not say that the non-nuclear Powers shall not proliferate but the nuclear Powers may proliferate and the nuclear Powers will agree only not to disseminate weapons and weapons technology. It says

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

that neither shall proliferate. This is a very important aspect of the first principle stipulated by the United Nations, and must be reflected in any draft which merits serious consideration.

This particular idea is carried forward in a concrete form in the second principle: that "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". (ibid., p.3). To the non-aligned non-nuclear nations this is the supreme principle. It is not merely a question of sovereign nations rejecting, in the second half of the twentieth century, treaties imposed by powerful nations on weak nations. It is not merely a question of rejection of unequal and discriminatory treaties. It is a principle specifically related to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and emphasizes that to effect a real solution of the problem we must deal with the single and organic issue of present as well as future proliferation.

This principle is very carefully drafted. It says unambiguously that this balance of responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear Powers must be embodied -- I repeat, embodied -- in the treaty. It does not mean that the nuclear Powers may, separately and outside the actual text of the treaty, agree to assume some obligations. Those obligations must be embodied in the treaty.

The main emphasis of this principle is, of course, on the balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. If there is to be real equality the nuclear Powers should go completely non-nuclear; but that, alas, does not appear to be a practical proposition at the moment. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been established to achieve that final consummation, but the Indian delegation appreciates that it is not easy to achieve total nuclear disarmament within a short time.

The second principle, as drafted, therefore talks of "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". (ibid.) There has therefore to be a balance. It has to be an acceptable balance -- that is, acceptable to all parties --, and it has to be a balance of mutual

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

responsibilities and obligations. Apart from the non-aligned memorandum of 15 September 1965 (ENDC/158), no document before us embodies this fundamental principle. The Indian delegation has urged on many occasions that the least that should be agreed upon, at least as a beginning, is that all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, should forgo further production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles designed to carry those weapons. A provision of this nature must necessarily be incorporated -- or, as the principle says, embodied -- in the treaty.

There is not the same difficulty in the propositions before us in regard to mutuality of obligations and responsibilities on the question of dissemination of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, except of course in drafting these responsibilities. We must thus have the same agreement in regard to the principle of mutuality in the context of production of weapons which the drafts before us seek to cover as far as the non-nuclear nations are concerned. The Committee must therefore devote its special attention to this principle, otherwise we shall be acting contrary to the directives given to us by the United Nations.

Then there is the third principle: that "The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament" (ibid., p.3). This reproduces the basic philosophy expressed in the non-aligned memorandum of 15 September 1965. As I said earlier, it is essential that we get away from the notion that all that is necessary is to ensure un-armament of unarmed countries and that we need do nothing towards disarmament. The formulation of this principle by the United Nations thus strengthens us in our conviction that while we are dealing with a non-proliferation treaty we must deal with the problem of reduction and eventual elimination of the nuclear menace as well. It is most encouraging to note that the overwhelming majority of nations who cast an affirmative vote on this resolution in the Assembly desire this to be the basic principle of an international treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The fourth principle stipulates that "There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty" (ibid.). We have the example of the Moscow test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which is at the same time a beacon of hope and a warning signal. The arrogant refusal of China to subscribe to this Treaty has brought us to this sorry state of affairs today. The Indian delegation is particularly distressed to find that many people talk in terms of accepting the

fait accompli, of accepting the evil. We must reject this attitude of mind unequivocally. Our great Master Mahatma Gandhi taught us one supreme principle: never to compromise with evil. The Indian delegation will have more to say on this fourth principle of the resolution when we have reached the stage of commenting on the detailed provisions of an acceptable treaty; for it will need to be borne in mind when we negotiate the question of the coming into force of the treaty and of the withdrawal clause.

Finally, the fifth principle rightly safeguards the special situation of the Latin-American States, the African States and any other States which are placed in a similar situation. It is a matter of profound regret to the Indian delegation that an opportunity given to us in Asia has been denied, particularly since October 1964, when this hitherto non-nuclear area suddenly exploded into a nuclearizing area. In consonance with its ancient traditions of Buddha and Gandhi, Christ and Mohammed, Confucius and Zoroaster, Asia had so much to offer to the world; but that was denied suddenly because the rulers of one country defied the world.

The Indian delegation hopes that the discussions in the Committee will proceed on the firm and unflinching basis of these five principles, and that we shall soon have a balanced treaty, an effective treaty and a treaty without loop-holes -- in fact, a treaty which solves the essential problem of proliferation: the problem of present as well of future proliferation. We are still hopeful, and that is why I have not spoken this morning of what I called the third approach, the approach underlying the Italian appeal for a moratorium (ENDC/157), with various suggestions of amendment -- as, for example, the suggestion made by the representative of Libya during the session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1356, p.33-35) to the effect that a moratorium should apply equally and appropriately to the nuclear and non-nuclear nations.

The Indian delegation will also have the opportunity of speaking in detail at some stage on the wise suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria: that, if a comprehensive non-proliferation treaty is likely to be delayed, the Committee might consider the question of negotiating a simple non-dissemination treaty which can embody mutual obligations and responsibilities on non-nuclear and nuclear nations alike not to receive or give nuclear weapons and technology. We commend that suggestion, as we did a similar suggestion made by the Prime Minister of Malta at the last session of the General Assembly (A/PV.1359, p.7). As I said, however, we all hope that we shall receive the unquestioned and unqualified support of all members for the five basic principles of the United Nations resolution, so that we can go ahead with our task of negotiating a genuine and comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

The problem of negotiating a treaty on non-proliferation has implications far beyond the realm of proliferation of nuclear weapons or even of general and complete disarmament. The attitudes that we take and the approaches we adopt on this will reflect our attitudes and approaches on international relations in general. It is therefore imperative that we take a global approach on this issue, take into account the needs and requirements of all members of the international community, and follow an approach which reflects our firm adherence to the sovereign equality of all nations and to the principles of equality and mutual benefit. Otherwise we shall be repeating the failures of the League of Nations.

I should like to conclude with a quotation from a letter written from prison by Jawaharlal Nehru on 2 August 1933 to his young daughter, who is now our Prime Minister:

"Another great failure at world efforts at co-operation has been the Disarmament Conference. This Conference was the outcome of the Covenant of the League of Nations ...

"The World Disarmament Conference met at last early in 1932. Month after month, year after year, it went on, considering many proposals and rejecting them, reading innumerable reports, listening to interminable arguments. From being a disarmament conference, it almost became an armaments conference. No agreement could be reached, for no country was prepared to consider the question from a wider international point of view; for each country disarmament meant that other countries should disarm or lessen their armaments while it kept up its own strength."

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 240th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlo Lukhanov, representative of Bulgaria.

"A statement was made by the representative of India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 17 February 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.